To be reasonable, it is important to have a sense of justice. A sense of justice is a normally effective desire to fulfil the duties and obligations required by the judiciary; This includes a willingness to work with others on fair terms that reasonable people can accept and approve. Rawls sees the sense of justice as an attribute that humans usually have; it „seems to be a condition of human sociability” (TJ, 495/433 rev.). He rejects the idea that people are motivated only by self-interest in everything they do; He also rejects the Hobbesian assumption that the will to do justice must be based on self-interest. It is essential to Rawls` argument for the feasibility and stability of justice as equity that the parties have an effective sense of justice when they enter society and that they, as members of society, are able to do what justice requires of them. either for their own good, or because they believe that this is what morality requires of them. An amoralist, Rawls believes, is largely a philosophical construct; Rawls considers amoralists who actually exist as sociopaths. Rawls shows the power of Maximin`s argument in the discussion of freedom of conscience. It says (TJ, § 33) that a person who is willing to endanger the right to maintain and practice his conscientious religious, philosophical and moral convictions only to obtain an uncertain added value by the utility principle does not know what it means to have beliefs of conscience, or at least does not take these beliefs seriously (TJ 207-08/181-82). A rational person who has beliefs about what gives meaning to life is not ready with the right to have and express those beliefs and the freedom to act, negotiate and play them.
After all, what could be the basis for negotiations, for what could be more important than the objects of the sincerest beliefs and commitments? Some people (e.g. Some nihilists) may have no belief in consciousness and are simply willing to act impulsively or by whatever thought or desires they have right now. But behind the veil of ignorance, no one knows if he or she is such a person, and there is no reason for this assumption. Since parties know general facts about human inclinations and sociability, they must take into account that they may very well have beliefs, values, and obligations that they are not willing to compromise. (Furthermore, the nihilist should want to protect his freedom to be a nihilist to protect himself from ending up in an intolerant religious society.) Thus, it remains irrational to endanger fundamental freedoms by choosing the principle of utility over the principles of justice. Given the long-standing and widespread influence of social contract theory, it is not surprising that it is also the subject of many critiques from different philosophical perspectives. In particular, racially conscious feminists and philosophers have made important arguments for the substance and feasibility of social contract theory. The original position plays a decisive role in Kantian constructivism. Rawls says that the original position is a „method of construction” that establishes an objective point of view from which objective principles of justice can be derived.
The principles of justice are „constructed” on the basis of the ideal ideas of man and society („ideas of reason” in Kant`s sense). In Kantian constructivism (CP chap.16), Rawls transforms the Kantian interpretation idea of „our nature as free and equal rational beings” into an ideal „conception of the person” that is considered a „free and equal moral person” with the two moral forces of practical thought. It is this idea of the person, associated with the ideal of social cooperation, represented by a well-ordered society „modeled” or „reflected” by the original position. In „Kantian Constructivism,” lecture II, Rawls explains how each of the relevant characteristics of the original position (including the veil of ignorance and the description of the parts as „rational agents of construction”) „represents” in some way the ideal conception of person and society that underlies Kantian constructivism. Since the original position presumably represents all relevant ideas and principles of practical reason, Rawls asserts that all the principles chosen from it are objectively correct, as a matter of „pure procedural justice at the highest level” of practical reasoning. (See below for the role of the original position in reflective balance.) Rawls said at one point that „reflective balance works through the original position.” The presumption is that the initial position itself provides, to a large extent, the relevant sense of „better alignment” of the moral beliefs considered with the principles of justice. The principles of justice that best fit our thoughtful beliefs of justice are those chosen by rational people as part of this hypothetical „method of construction” that even „represents” our reflective beliefs about all relevant reasons for discussing social justice principles. Rawls concludes in A Theory of Justice: „Every aspect of the original position can be provided with an explanation to back it up. What we do, therefore, is to summarize in a conception all the conditions which, with appropriate consideration, we are prepared to recognize as reasonable in our conduct among ourselves” (TJ 587/514).
In response to Hubee`s argument that the doctrine of the social contract is superfluous: until opponents of the doctrine of Rawls` treatise present an alternative argument for the principles of justice that is more persuasive and includes all relevant reasons of justice, Rawls` initial position argument should be considered essential to the justification of the principles of justice (to the extent that they are justified). The reasons for the rational choice of the principle of difference by the parties are their best interest in developing their capacity for justice, their concern for self-respect, their concern for stability and the burden of commitment. Compare the principle of difference with the principle of limited utility: once the social minimum is reached, limited utility does not guarantee that the poorest will in any way benefit from additional gains for the better-off. On the contrary, new gains for beneficiaries can disadvantage even the least profitable – for example, a lower minimum wage rate in the face of increased labour supply leads to a greater share of capital flows, which may benefit middle-class owners and consumers, but not the least fortunate workers. In the case of limited utility, there is no consistent and sustained tendency towards reciprocity of benefits, because once the social minimum is reached, the less fortunate are as likely to earn nothing as to benefit from additional gains for the wealthiest. Rawls` assertion in (a) is that deviations from the equality of a list of what he calls primary goods—”the things a rational man wants, whatever he wants” [Rawls, 1971, p. 92]—are justified only to the extent that they improve the lot of those who are worst off under this distribution over the previous ones. equals, the distribution.
Its position is egalitarian, at least in a sense, with a provision that inequality is permissible if it benefits the less fortunate. An important consequence from Rawls` point of view is that inequality can actually be as long as it benefits the less wealthy. His argument in favour of this position is strongly based on the assertion that morally arbitrary factors (for example, the family into which one is born) should not determine life chances or chances. Rawls is also guided by the intuition that a person does not morally deserve his innate talents; so that one is not entitled to all the benefits that one could derive from it; This eliminates at least one of the criteria that could represent an alternative to equality in the evaluation of distributive justice. The state of nature is therefore not the same as the state of war, as is the case according to Hobbes. However, it can enter a state of war, especially a state of war due to property disputes. While the state of nature is the state of freedom in which individuals recognize natural law and therefore do not harm each other, the state of war between two or more people begins as soon as one man declares war on another by stealing him or trying to make him his slave.