The second type of statement is prescriptive. Prescriptive statements are prescriptive. They claim how the world should be. It`s just a matter of opinion. In the social sciences, the term „normative” has broadly the same meaning as its use in philosophy, but can also refer to the role of cultural „norms” in a sociological context; common values or institutions that structural functionalists consider to be constitutive of social structure and social cohesion. These values and units of socialization therefore work to promote or impose the social activities and outcomes that should occur (relative to the norms implicit in these structures), while discouraging or preventing social activities that should not take place. That is, they promote social activities that have social value (see philosophy above). While there are always abnormalities in social activity (usually described as a „crime” or antisocial behavior, see also normality (behavior)), the normative effects of commonly held beliefs (such as „family values” or „common sense”) push most social activities toward a generally homogeneous crowd. From this argument, however, functionalism shares an affinity for ideological conservatism. Ronald Dworkin played a key role in this movement with his famous distinction between the criteria of „aptitude” and „justification”. If two or more views of the law „match” sufficiently to the cases, bylaws and other legal documents, Dworkin argued, difficult cases must be resolved by asking which point of view agrees with the best justification for the law. So if there are two or more interpretations of the equality safeguard clause that fit the text and the cases, we should choose the interpretation that fits our best equality theory – and that`s probably a great normative theory.
Unlike positive economics, which relies on objective analysis of data, normative economics is heavily interested in value judgments and statements about „what should be,” rather than facts based on statements of cause and effect. It expresses ideological judgments about what can lead to economic activity when public policy changes are made. Prescriptive economic statements cannot be verified or verified. Assuming we know what consent is, we can ask, „What is the legal and moral effect of consent and why? However, our normative conclusions cannot come solely from a positive analysis. However, policymakers, entrepreneurs, and other organizational authorities also tend to consider what is desirable and what is not desirable for their respective constituents, making normative economics an important part of the equation for deciding important economic issues. Coupled with a positive economy, normative economics can branch into many opinion-based solutions that reflect how an individual or an entire community represents certain economic projects. These types of views are particularly important for national policy makers or leaders. Some of the most important conceptual tools used by legal theorists are likely to be familiar to most law students in their undergraduate studies. One of them is the concept of „social contract” – known to Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau. But unless you`re an undergraduate degree in philosophy or have a thesis in philosophy, you may not be as familiar with some of the ideas that arose from the social contract tradition. One of them is the development of social contract theory in the political philosophy of John Rawls. Two other ideas are „contractarianism” and „contractualism”—different positions in the social contract tradition, respectively associated with David Gauthier and Thomas („Tim”) Scanlon — and, of course, many others.
We have another important issue to consider. Consent may be invalid. Consider three types of grounds for concluding that consent is invalid and therefore consent does not change the legal or moral situation: (1) deception, (2) coercion, and (3) incapacity. Is the state of nature a real historical state or a hypothetical state? A line of criticism begins with the assertion that the state of nature cannot be a real historical condition of human society. If there has never been a historical state such as the state of nature and therefore no real „social contract”, then the argument could go, what is its normative meaning. The fact that fictitious individuals were able to accept a social contract under fictitious conditions seems to lack normative momentum. Libertarian theory can be criticized in several ways. Sometimes the disagreement is mostly empirical: libertarians believe life would be better without the state, and anti-libertarians believe it would be worse.
But sometimes critics of libertarianism have a radically different view of the government`s fundamental goals. One of these rivals is egalitarianism—the view that distributive justice requires that goods (leaving the definition of good at the abstract level) be divided equally, and that the creation of social equality is the primary goal of government. Some libertarians may accept this goal, but argue that maximum freedom is the best way to achieve it. Other libertarians may argue that freedom is the good that should be shared equitably. But many libertarians see equality as the wrong goal of government. That is, sometimes libertarians and egalitarians are fundamentally different in terms of the purpose of government. Virtue and consent – Consent will also be relevant to aretaic (or virtue-based) moral theories. One of the virtues is justice, and people with this virtue will not violate the rights of others without their consent. The ethics of virtue differs from deontological and utilitarian theories in part because virtue ethics denies that there is a decision-making process for ethics. In other words, an ethics of virtue is unlikely to believe that consent can operate „moral magic,” but rather to believe that the moral meaning of consent is contextual – depending on the particular circumstances of the case.
The ethics of virtue are also likely to raise the question of whether the person to whom consent has been given is a virtuous means. Individuals who do not have the virtues are likely to give consent when they should not – if, for example, consent could actually cause undue hardship to the assets or capabilities of the consenting agent. In such circumstances, virtue ethics might deny that consent works moral magic. A virtuous act may feel compelled not to enjoy consent, despite the fact that consent was freely given by an officer who can meet the legal standard of jurisdiction without coercion or deception. One of the most important debates in metaethics (from the point of view of normative legal theory) is the debate between cognitivism and non-cognitivism. Very broadly, cognitivism is the position that moral statements (such as „There should be a constitutional right to privacy”). Express beliefs that may be true or false. (Beliefs are „cognitive” states, hence the name „cognitivism.”) Non-cognitivism denies this, claiming that moral statements express non-cognitive states such as emotions or desires. Non-cognitive states (emotions, desires) cannot be true or false.
What are the consequences of breach of contract? Another question could be the consequences of breaking the social contract. If the sovereign breaks the contract, one possible consequence is that citizens are released from their obligation to obey the sovereign`s orders or have the right to participate in the revolution. Another possibility, particularly interesting to legal theorists, is that violations of the social contract by the legislative or executive branch are not a „law” and therefore should not be enforced by the judiciary. There is an obvious problem in situating the foundations of a political theory such as libertarianism in a deeper moral theory, such as a form of deontology or consequentialism. In a pluralistic society, it seems very unlikely that one view of morality will ever become the dominant view. Instead, modern pluralistic societies are typically characterized by persistent disagreements over deep moral issues. If any particular form of libertarianism is based on deep moral foundations, then most of us will reject that form of libertarianism because we reject the foundations. An alternative would be to try to argue for libertarianism based on all the different moral theories, but this would obviously be a very long and difficult task.